Introduction {#sec1-1}
============

Pediatric Surgery has evolved as a superspeciality in surgical practice and advances in anesthesiology and perioperative intensive care have made complex procedures viable and possible. Technological advances however do not make the practice error proof and human errors attributable to an incorrect attitude, negligence, overconfidence and functioning that is not evidence based tend to precipitate complications.\[[@ref1]\] Moreover, young children, and newborns in particular look alike, bear similar names and are unable to communicate their own names and complaints. A safety culture thus needs to evolve and the theatre personnel need to pull together as a team.\[[@ref2]\] The present article describes the process of implementation of a surgical checklist with a view to develop a safety culture and attitudinal change at a University teaching hospital in Western India.

Materials and Methods {#sec1-2}
=====================

The Department of Pediatric Surgery adopted in 2011, the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist and applied it to 3000 consecutive surgeries that were done under general anaesthesia upto 2013; a 2 year period. The list comprised of three components: Before induction, before surgical incision and the third phase being before the end of surgery and before the patient was wheeled out of operation theatre. The salient points considered were: In the pre-induction phase: Identification of the patient and the consent for the procedure, fasting status confirmation, identification of the side to be operated upon and its marking, pulse oximeter, suction apparatus, availability of medications and airway equipment, defibrillator and patient warming mattress in working condition, medication allergies of the patient, anticipated risks in airway management and anesthesia, availability of blood and blood products. After anesthesia was induced, several checks were done between checklist coordinator and surgeons as well as nursing team. The team members acknowledged each others' roles, identification of the patient, side of the operation and planned procedure, anticipated critical events in surgery. Antibiotic administration was confirmed and its time noted. Diathermy settings and the placement of the grounding pad and the body contact with the patient was confirmed. The patient was strapped and immobilized to the operation table. Removal of metal bangles, ear rings, nose ring, and ornamental waist bands and anklets was confirmed. Necessary radiology imaging was displayed in the theatre. Nursing team reviewed the instruments available and the gauze and mop count before the incision was made. Finally in the third phase, at the end of operation, the gauze or mop count was rechecked, the name of the completed procedure was recorded by the nursing team, the specimen for histopathology was labeled and made ready for dispatch to histopathology and all needles, sponges and instruments were accounted for. If any instrument (e.g., diathermy, heating mattress) had malfunctioned during the performance of the operation, this issue was addressed before the commencement of the next one. The checklist addressed nearly 20 points and was a part of routine theater process.

Results {#sec1-3}
=======

In the period from 2011 to 2013, no major peri-operative errors and events were noted. In 9 (0.3%) of patients events that could be classified as "near missed catastrophe" were observed. In 54 (1.8%) patients, children had the same names and an identical surgical procedure posted on the same operation list on the same day (circumcision for example). In 21 (0.7%) of them, there was an additional procedure of herniotomy to be performed whose mention in the identification tag was missed. The identification tag of the patient itself had come off in 4 patients in the transit toward the operation theatre and that was picked up due to the checklist protocol. Residents and junior staff members had missed out on mentioning the side of procedures like herniotomy, orchidopexy in 108 (3.6%) cases. In 3 (0.1%) of patients who were to undergo major resective procedures like nephrectomy there was mix up regarding the side of the surgery in the case notes consent forms. In 78 (2.6%) of cases the consent form was not signed by parents/guardians nor was the side of the procedure quoted in these forms. Pre-operative antibiotic orders were missing in 5 patients. In 12 (0.4%) cases specifically in laparoscopy, the immobilization of the patients was suboptimal and had led to displacement of grounding pad losing patient contact. The mop and gauze counts were always physically checked and there were no errors there. In 54 (1.8%) patients, we found that the checklist was not used at all. In 76 (2.5%) patients the checklist was found to be incompletely filled. In all these cases, it was the third part of the checklist which was not adhered to.

Discussion {#sec1-4}
==========

The concept of using a checklist in surgical and anesthetic practice was energized by publication of the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist in 2008.\[[@ref3]\] It was believed that by routinely checking common safety issues, and by better team communication and dynamics, peri-operative morbidity and mortality could be addressed consistently. The magnitude of improvement demonstrated by the WHO pilot studies has been reconfirmed in some centers.\[[@ref4]\] However, some other series have refuted any improvements in the outcome of operative procedures.\[[@ref5]\] The present study indicates that in pediatric surgery, surgical checklists, can contribute to improving patient safety. Adherence to the checklist helped in detect instance of human error and instances of equipment malfunction and identify areas that needed strengthening and streamlining.

To many critics, the checklist protocol appears to be a "trivial" practice addressing very "routine" issues. However, minor errors have a multiplicative effect. Introducing surgical checklists is not as straightforward as it seems and requires leadership, flexibility, tenacity and teamwork.\[[@ref6]\] The WHO checklist we used also required modification to suit the regional issues with respect to the patient demography. While the senior authors are in a team that has been working together for the last 12 years, junior colleagues are trainees who leave after a stipulated period. Before the checklist was put in practice, there was a detailed discussion with the entire team about the need, the format and inclusion of the components of the check list. We still found that in some instances there was a tendency to do away with the checklists particularly by junior colleagues in the times of an emergency. The junior colleagues in the absence of senior colleagues had a tendency to proceed without adhering to checklist protocols. The challenge therefore is to change the operating theatre culture to reduce minor problems and interruptions that may impact surgical performance and also to improve non-technical skills in the operating theatre. Formal training in non-technical skills conducted in simulator laboratories and class rooms has been shown to improve patient outcomes, but there is often resistance from operating teams.\[[@ref7]\] Communication errors are the most common cause of adverse events in healthcare. It is often noted that the information does not reach the right person, or is inaccurate, or issues remain unresolved until they become critical.\[[@ref8]\] In the operating theatre, this leads to mistakes, inefficient use of resources, wasted equipment, frustration, poor morale, delays, complications, rise in morbidity and cancelled operations. Patterns of inter-professional communication in theatre follow complex hierarchies, and the communication style of senior members of the team acts as an important role model for trainees. A confrontational or an unjustifiable authoritative style may be mimicked, or it may act as a barrier to a trainee speaking up.\[[@ref9][@ref10]\]

High volume, rapid turnover departments have demonstrated that minor problems, distractions, or equipment problems were associated with increased operating time and reduced operative performance.\[[@ref11]\] Literature also supports the view, that not only technical skills, but also the behavioral patterns and non-technical skills of the surgeon and anesthesiologist (leadership, teamwork, problem-solving, decision-making, and situation awareness), that affect surgical outcomes have got positively influenced by the checklist protocol.\[[@ref12][@ref13]\]

A limitation of the present study is that the outcome may have been influenced by an observer bias. Using the checklist would also cause an additional anxiety for the adolescent awake patient. Concerns were often voiced that the checklist may be difficult to use in urgent or emergency situations. In summary. our study supports the use of the surgical checklist as an essential safety tool. Effective implementation however would require training, coaching, and a change in safety attitude, with routine measurement and regular feedback of outcomes.
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